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BOOK REVIEW

PAUL H. ROBINSON'S CRIMINAL LAW
Robert Batey*
Paul H. Robinson ranks among America's foremost professors of
criminal law. Beginning his teaching career at Rutgers University
School of Law-Camden, where he rose to the rank of distinguished
professor and was briefly acting dean, Robinson moved to Northwestern University School of Law in 1993, after serving two rather controversial years on the United States Sentencing Commission.' One of
the founders of the CriminalLaw Forum, he now advises the Journal of
CriminalLawand Criminology. More important though than this enviable record of service is Robinson's extraordinary scholarship. Not yet
fifty, he has produced a score of significant law review articles, a twovolume treatise on criminal law defenses, 2 a casebook, 3 and with a coauthor, a remarkable book-length synthesis of legal analysis and behavioral science.4 So the appearance in 1997 of a single-volume
treatise entitled CriminalLaw 5 promised much: that Robinson would
* Professor, Stetson University College of Law. Gary Cors and Keith Hammond,
second-year students at Stetson, provided research assistance; my colleague Mark
Brown commented helpfully on an early draft of the review. All errors are of course

my own responsibility.
1 CompareDissenting View of Commissioner Paul H. Robinson on the Promulgation of Sentencing Guidelines by the United States Sentencing Commission (May 1,
1987), with Preliminary Observations of the Commission on Commissioner Robinson's Dissent (May 1, 1987).
2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CUMuNAL LAW DEFENSEs: CRnms, AL PRArccE SERIES (1984).
3 PAUL H. ROBINSON, FuNDAmENTALS IN CRM'INAL LAw (2d ed. 1995).
4 PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARL=, JusrIcE, LJABaIrly AN BLAME: CommuNrY VEws AND Tm CRIMINAL LAW (1995), reviewed in Christopher Slobogin, Is Justice
Just Us? Using Social Science to Inform Substantive CriminalLaw, 87J. Cram. L. & CmiMI-

315, 316 (1996) (["T]he book is a major breakthrough in the application of
the scientific method to criminal law issues, and should be viewed both as a rich
source of ideas for criminal theory and as a model for interdisciplinary work.").
5 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAw (1997).
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turn his formidable intellect toward the concerns of the primary users
of one-volume comprehensive treatises, students and teachers.
That these are the readers Robinson hoped would benefit from
his work is apparent in the treatise's first paragraph, listing the purposes of the volume:
The book's three primary goals are all typical of what a teacher
would think important in a treatise: It seeks to convey, first, a description of the existing rules of American criminal law; second, an
understanding of each rule, its application, and the reasoning behind it; and, third, a conceptual framework of criminal law that ex6
plains the interrelations among the rules.
Unfortunately, 7 the work fails to satisfy any of these purposes.
The treatise's most serious defect is its failure fully to
"descri[be] ... the existing rules of American criminal law."8 Robinson's book flatly equates the Model Penal Code to contemporary
American criminal law, overlooking the wide (and expanding) divergence between the American Law Institute's thirty-five year old work
product and today's criminal statutes. Less serious, but still troubling,
are the recurring deficiencies in the treatise's explications of the
Code's rules, particularly its culpability provisions, of which Robinson
has given strained readings since the publication of one of his first
major articles in 1983. 9 Finally, in attempting to provide a coherent
"conceptual framework" for its subject, Robinson's treatise distorts the
inevitable incoherence of an everchanging body of law; round pegs
end up in square holes, in order to accommodate a systematic conception of criminal law that deprives it of most of its vitality and interest.
These defects in Robinson's work have a greater significance, for
they symbolize similar defects in the criminal law professoriate. It is
relatively easy to teach the Model Penal Code as if it were the law
everywhere; further, the professor acquires a patina of prestige from
teaching "national" as opposed to merely "local" law. There is also a
certain enjoyment in splitting hairs in class about the meaning of particular Code provisions, even though one knows that the students are
never likely to encounter their language again. And God knows law
professors love to develop conceptual frameworks, systems to explain
6 Id. atxv.
7 I consider myself among the unfortunate. I did not volunteer for this assignment. Instead, a "friend" suggested my name to the editors of the Notre Dame Law
Review. I agreed to write this book review before I had even cracked the spine of
Robinson's treatise. I truly wish I could have liked the book more.
8 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at xv.
9 Paul H. Robinson &Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining CriminalLiability:
The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681 (1983).
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every nuance of every decision. One aim of this review is to suggest
that criminal law teachers think twice before succumbing to these
temptations.

The most serious problem students and teachers will have in using Criminal Law is that it does not adequately present "the existing
rules of American criminal law."' 0 With relatively few exceptions,
Robinson devotes his treatise to a study of the Model Penal Code, because "the Model Penal Code now represents American criminal law
as much or more than does any other code."" This artfully crafted
sentence is certainly correct, for if one could teach only one set of
statutes, the Model Penal Code would be the best one to select. But of
course law teachers are not constrained in this way: statutes *andrules
from more than one jurisdiction may be selected to give students a
more rounded picture of the law in all jurisdictions. If a treatise (or a
teacher) commits to describing American criminal law, the coverage
must go beyond the Model Penal Code.
To support his claim that the Code represents current American
law, Robinson cites the American Law Institute itself for the proposition that "The Model Penal Code has served as a basis for wholesale
replacement of existing criminal codes in over two-thirds of the
states."' 2 "[W]holesale replacement" is an overstatement, as others
have recognized.' 3 For example, the American Law Institute claims
Florida (where I teach) as a state whose criminal statutes have been
substantially affected by the Code, yet one will search the Florida Statutes in vain for anything analogous to Part I of the Code, its general
provisions. 14 There is nothing like section 2.02, "General Principles of
Culpability," which may be considered the heart of the Model Penal
Code, nor is there a statutory definition of insanity, another of the
Code's most celebrated sections. There are no general sections on
necessity, duress, mistake, or intoxication. The statutory provisions regarding justification defenses, accomplice liability, and inchoate offenses bear little resemblance to the Code's provisions. While Florida
10 See supra text accompanying note 6.
11 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at xv.
12 Id. at 68 n.13 (citing 1984 A.L.I. ANN. REP. 21); see also id. at xv, 69.
13

"A few of the states in which new legislation has been enacted have adopted

only minor revisions, essentially retaining the common-law orientation of their previous codes." RIcHARD J. BoNNmI ET AL., CRIMNAL LAW, at A-3 (1997). Robinson
mutedly acknowledges the point. ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 68.
14 See ROBINSON, supra note 5 at 70 (identifying "a General Part" as one of the
"hallmarks" of "[m]odern criminal codes").
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may have adopted some of the Code's definitions of specific crimes,' 5
to say that its mishmash of randomly enacted statutes and court-made
rules resembles the Code is false. One wonders how many other states
6
on the American Law Institute's list fall into this category.'
A better quick index of the Code's influence might be how many
jurisdictions have adopted versions of section 2.02, which defines the
four levels of culpability used under the Code: purpose, knowledge,
recklessness, and negligence. The official commentary to the Code
reveals that the states are about evenly split, with populous jurisdictions like California, Florida, and Michigan left with no such provision.' 7 And of course the largest jurisdiction of all, the federal
government, has nothing like section 2.02.
Yet Robinson assumes that the Code's provisions are the law in
America, with scant discussion of other options. Emblematic of this
overemphasis on the Model Penal Code is the treatise's early treatment (in its first section) of the "de minimis infraction" defense created by section 2.12 of the Code. Robinson cites this provision as
evidence that "[c] riminal law addresses only harms of a sufficient seriousness."' 8 Nowhere in this discussion, nor in the several subsequent
mentions of the section 2.12,19 does the treatise bother to note that
only five American jurisdictions have adopted it.20
Robinson's excessive attention to the Model Penal Code is highlighted by his occasional deflections from it, which point toward what
the treatise might have been. The most notable of these fuller treatments is his section on the insanity defense, 21 which discusses not only
the Code's test for insanity, but also the M'Naghten rule, its irresistible15 There is Model Penal Code language in Florida's kidnapping statute, but Florida's homicide, assault and battery, sexual battery, arson, burglary, theft, robbery, and
forgery provisions do not track the Code. Compare FLA. STAT. ch. 787.01 (1995) with
MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 (Official Draft and Explanatory Notes 1985).
16 Wyoming, also claimed by the American Law Institute, provides another somewhat less stark example: "[T] he Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982... represented in
some instances a thorough re-working of previous criminal statutes, often influenced
strongly by the Model Penal Code and other contemporary criminal law reform proposals, while in others the Criminal Code merely reenacted the language of the old
criminal statutes." Theodore E. Lauer, Burglary in Wyoming, 32
721, 741 (1997).

LAND

& WATER L. REv.

17 See 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Part I, § 2.02, at 233 n.4 (Official
Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
18 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 6.
19 Id. at 56, 96-97, 132-33, 515 n.30, 783 n.7.
20 See Stanislaw Pomorski, On Multiculturalism, Concepts of Crime, and the "De
Minimis"Defense, 1997 BYU L. REV. 51, 51 n.2 (citing Hawaii, Maine, NewJersey, Pennsylvania, and Guam as the five relevant American jurisdictions).
21 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 509-19.
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impulse corollary, the federal statutory standard, the Durham test, the
guilty-but-mentally-ill verdict, and the option of abolishing the insanity
defense. The reader thus gets a good sense of the range of insanity
defense law in the United States today.
But even in this more balanced section, Robinson cannot resist
overselling the Model Penal Code's insanity defense, which has been
22
in eclipse since the not-guilty verdict in the trial of John Hinckley:
"The [Code] test has gained wide acceptance, rivaling or surpassing

the popularity of McNaghten and McNaghten-plus-irresistible-impulse
formulations." 23 As authority for this proposition Robinson cites his
1984 treatise on criminal defenses, 24 but the current supplement to
this work (not prepared by Robinson) indicates that a number of the
states cited as Model Penal Code jurisdictions in 1984 have since
switched to variations on the M'Naghten rule.2 5 Unwarranted emphasis on the Model Penal Code test results in the treatise's slighting
some important questions under M'Naghten (which most authorities
recognize as the majority view today26), such as uncertainty whether
the test applies to knowledge of the legal or moral wrongfulness of
27
one's behavior.
22 SeeJOsHuA DREss;La, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 317 (2d ed. 1995).
23 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 515 (footnote omitted).
24 Id. at 515 n.28. Robinson cites "2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES
§ 173(a) n.2 (1984)," but the relevant footnote is note 4.
25 Compare ROBINSON, supra note 2, § 173(a), at 282 n.4 (1984) with id. at 45
(Supp. 1997).
26 SeeWAYNE R. LAFAvE &AusTIN W. ScoTm, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 312 (2d ed. 1986);
DRESSLER, supra note 22, at 317.
27 A passing reference to this issue appears in a footnote. See ROBINSON, supra
note 5, at 514 n.26. For a recent case dealing with this question, see State v. Wilson,
700 A.2d 633 (Conn. 1997). More space might also have been devoted to the supposed "high standard" set by the irresistible-impulse test, which is asserted in the text,
see ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 517, but questioned in a preceding footnote, see id. at
515 n.27, and to the relationship between the insanity defense and civil commitment.
On the latter point, Robinson asserts, "The answer to the problem of dangerous but
insane offenders lies not in the perversion of the insanity defense but rather in the
adoption of civil commitment standards and procedures that will adequately protect
the public." Id. at 519. As an example of such standards and procedures, he cites
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983), see ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 519 n.43, a
case some have condemned as a perversion of the process of civil commitment, see
Peter Margulies, The "PandemoniumBetween the Mad and the Bad" Proceduresfor the Commitment and Release of Insanity Acquittees AfterJones v. United States, 36 RUTGERS L. REv.
793 (1984); Winsor C. Schmidt, Jr., Supreme Court DecisionMaking on InsanityAcquittees
Does Not Depend on Research Conducted by the Behavioral Science Community: Jones v.
United States, 12J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 507 (1984). This approach begs the question why
one body of law should be sullied so that another may remain pure.
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Stressing the Code's insanity test is perhaps justifiable because of
its superiority to the other tests available (though many would disagree about which test is best).28 Robinson seems to generalize this
point into an argument that the Model Penal Code is superior to
other law, which might in turn justify his emphasis on it. But his repeated criticisms of the Code's provisions belie this implicit claim. After stating that section 2.03, on causation, is "probably the only major
provision that is analytically flawed," 29 Robinson directly and indirectly questions scores of the Code's provisions, including those on
involuntariness, 30 omissions, 3 ' element analysis, 3 2 concurrence of the
act and mental requirements, 33 purpose applied to a circumstance element,3 4 culpability in general (to which Robinson suggests "a few revisions"), 3 5 applying a stated culpability to all elements of the
offense,3 6 mistake,3 7 intoxication,3 8 accomplice liability, 39 committing
crime through an innocent agent,40 defenses to complicity, 4 1 causing
the conditions of one's defense, 42 mistaken belief in justifying facts, 43
choice-of-evils, 44 the public authority defense, 45 self-defense, 46 unknown justification, 47 a subjectivized standard of reasonableness, 4 8 the
statute of limitations, 49 punishing attempts, 50 the mental require28 Cf BONNIE ET AL., supra note 13, at 454-56 (noting criticisms of and deviations
from the Model Penal Code test after the Hinckley verdict); DRESSLER, supra note 22,
at 322 (incorporating in a list of criticisms of the Code test criticism of any test with a
volitional prong); LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 26, at 329-32 (listing criticisms of the
Code test).
29 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 169.
30 Id. at 185, 500.
31 Id. at 194, 196, 201 n.41.
32 Id. at 211 n.15 (["T]he Model Penal Code's implementation of element analysis is admittedly seriously flawed in many respects."); see also id. at 232, 340.
33 Id. at 217-18.
34 Id. at 222-23.
35 Id. at 235-38.
36 Id. at 238-42, 341-42 & n.14, 389-90.
37 Id. at 264.
38 Id. at 310 n.8.
39 Id. at 329, 331-32.
40 Id. at 340-43.
41 Id. at 348 & n.13, 354 n.32.
42 Id. at 391.
43 Id. at 390 & nn.12-13, 391-94 & n.21, 463-64.
44 Id. at 412 n.11, 413 & n.15.
45 Id. at 426-27 & n.9.
46 Id. at 439, 441-42.
47 Id. at 474.
48 Id. at 538-39 & n.26.
49 Id. at 577-78.
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ments for attempt 51 and conspiracy,5 2 Wharton's Rule, 53 the relationship between conspiracy and complicity,5 4 conspiracies with multiple
objectives, 55 impossibility,5 6 renunciation,5 7 the mental requirement
for homicide, 58 felony murder, 59 aggravated assault, 60 rape, 61 causing
a catastrophe, 62 burglary,63 the grading of robbery and theft,64 unlawfulness as an element of theft,65 and theft's mental requirement.6 6 After identifying so many flaws, one can hardly claim that the Model
Penal Code deserves exclusive focus because it constitutes "better
law."
Of course the Code deserves considerable attention in a treatise
(or course) on criminal law, but overemphasizing it sacrifices much.
Consequently, the following list of questions that receive short shrift
in Robinson's treatise is substantial.
Because the mental requirement for crime concerned the drafters of the Model Penal Code more than the act requirement, the
Code's general part gives little concentrated attention to actus reus,
and so too does Robinson's treatise. For example, the connections
between the principle of legality, the vagueness doctrine, and the construction of criminal statutes, suggested first by Herbert Packer 6 7 and
69
later developed byJohnJeffries, 68 receive only superficial treatment
50

Id. at 616, 619, 620, 695.

51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Id. at 633-34.
Id. at 651-53.
Id. at 646.
Id. at 655-56.
Id. at 665.
Id. at 687-88.
Id. at 697, 700.
Id. at 708 n.4.
Id. at 730-31.
Id. at 739 n.13.
Id. at 752-53, 763-64.
Id. at 774.
Id. at 778.
Id. at 781.
Id. at 784-85.
Id. at 785-86.

67

See generallyHERBERT L. PACKER, THE LiMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 71-102

(1968).
68 See generallyJohn Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of
Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REv. 189 (1985); see also PETER W. Low ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS ch. 1 (2d ed. 1986) (coauthored byJeffries), currently published
as BoNNIE Er AL., supra note 13.
69 ROBINSON, supranote 5, at 73-85, 87-97. This material includes four pages of
hypotheticals and their analyses. See infra text accompanying note 154. It also includes a digression on the lack of legality concerns in discretionary sentencing, which
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The treatise's discussion of the vagueness doctrine gives little guidance as to how to evaluate criminal statutes for potential vagueness,
and its treatment of statutory construction is mainly a championing of
70
the Code's "fair import" rule over the rule of strict construction.
Other topics that taken together illuminate thinking about actus
reus-voluntariness, liability for omissions, possession, the act requirement for attempt 7T-are

instead parceled out,72 so their congruences

are less apparent. Robinson even denigrates the role of the act requirement in drawing these various topics together:
It appears, then, that it is not the act
requirement but rather the definition of offenses, including inchoate offenses, that ensures that conduct is sufficiently related to the
offense to support liability.... Is there value in the "act requirement"? ...[ T]he primary function of the act requirement is to
ISACT-REUIWEMENNAE:ED?

identify those cases where the special rules of possession and omis73
sion liability come into play.

Given this attitude, a teacher who seeks to emphasize the functions served by the criminal law's act requirement 74-or the student
who has such an instructor-will find little assistance in Robinson's

treatise.
Another teacher might agree with Robinson that actus reus is relatively umimportant, but might want to emphasize burdens of persuasion. The treatise will not serve this teacher or her students well
either because the topic apparently held little fascination for the drafters of Model Penal Code. Robinson's section on burdens of persuasion 75 skims through Mullaney v. Wilbur76 and Pattersonv. New York 77 in
a paragraph, as a sidebar to discussion of the Code's sections on burcuriously (given Robinson's service on the United States Sentencing Commission)
fails to mention the move to sentencing guidelines.
70 The fact that I am (perhaps abnormally) interested in these topics has probably affected my perception of Robinson's coverage; a teacher who glosses over vagueness and construction might find the treatise adequate on them. But I would want to
try to convince that teacher that the topics are more important than the treatise and
the teacher's coverage would imply. See generally Robert Batey, Vagueness and the Construction of CriminalStatutes BalancingActs, 5 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 1 (1997).
71 See generally Low ET AL., supra note 68, at 107-91.
72 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 175-87, 190-203, 281 n.9, 286, 498-506.
73 Id. at 180-81.
74 For a thumbnail sketch of some of these functions, see John Calvin Jeffries, Jr.
& Paul B. Stephan III, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proofin the CriminalLaw, 88
YALE L.J. 1325, 1371 n.130 (1979), quoted in BONNIE ET AL., supra note 13, at 217-18.
75 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 121-27.
76 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
77 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
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dens of persuasion.' 8 This superficiality is telling, for it leads Robinson into error when discussing a facet of strict liability law. He
identifies, as an "attractive solution" to the problems generated by liability without fault, a rule that makes negligence the standard but
places the burden of persuasion on the defendant. He then asserts
that the Supreme Court has prohibited any such rule, with a crossreference to his section on burdens of persuasion. 79 While Robinson's statement is literally correct, he should have added that a functional equivalent of his rule-retaining strict liability but making nonnegligence an affirmative defense, with the defendant bearing the
burden of persuasion-would be fully constitutional under the current interpretation of Mullaney and Patterson.8 0 Similar affirmative de81
fenses are discussed appreciatively elsewhere in the treatise.
Regarding causation, the treatise devotes most of its space to applying a variation on section 2.03 of the Code to several fact situations.8 2 Considering this section's spotty record of adoption by the
states 83 -and the even spottier record of the variation Robinson discusses, part of the Proposed Rhode Island Criminal Code-the treatise reader would have been better served by a more balanced
treatment of Code and non-Code approaches to causation. Similarly,
the treatise's presentation regarding mens rea shortchanges specific
and general intent (two paragraphs), 84 willful blindness (one paragraph),8 5 and liability for negligence (three paragraphs), 86 again be78 ROBINSON, supranote 5, at 124-25. Another paragraph mentions Sandstrom v.
Montana,442 U.S. 510 (1979). ROBINSON, supranote 5, at 126. qCounty Court of Ulster
County v. Alen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979), appears in a footnote. ROBINSON, supra note 5, at

127 n.22.
79 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 253-54 & n.28.
80 See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987), discussedin DRESSLER, supranote 22, at
58-59.
81 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 366, 729-30.
82 Id. at 153-73, 295-300.
83 A recent survey indicates that seven states have causation provisions that generally follow the pattern of section 2.03. SeeA~iz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-203 (West 1989);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § § 262-264 (1995); HAW.REV. STAT. ANN.§ § 702-214 to -217
(Michie 1994); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.060 (Banks-Baldwin 1995); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 45-2-201 (1997); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-3 (West 1995); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 303 (West 1983). Two other states show sections 2.03's influence. See ALA. CODE
§ 13A-2-5 (1975); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.04 (West 1994). Research disclosed no
court adopting section 2.03's requirements without prior legislative approval, but
courts in otherjurisdictions have occasionally cited it. See, e.g., Velazquez v. State, 561
So. 2d 347, 350-51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Peaslee, 571 A.2d 825, 827 (Me.
1990); State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1215 & n.10 (Utah 1993).
84 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 209-10.
85 Id. at 214-15.

NOTRE DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 73:3

cause section 2.02 of the Code supersedes these topics. But those who
teach or hope to practice in the half of America that does not follow
section 2.02 are shortchanged as well.
Though the Model Penal Code's law of accomplice liability has
not been widely adopted,8 7 Robinson's treatise focuses on it,88 thus
giving scant attention to interesting questions arising in non-Code jurisdictions. The accomplice's liability for crimes that are the natural
and probable consequences of the principal's crime receives only two
paragraphs of discussion, one in a footnote, 9 while the availability of
a defense because the perpetrator is unconvictable gets another two
paragraphs discussing only English cases (one of them overruled).90
In discussing justification defenses, the treatise systematically
downplays non-Code approaches. The section on the choice-of-evils
defense mentions some variations from the Model Penal Code approach, 9 1 but they seem to be afterthoughts9 2 despite the fact that
86 Id. at 216-17. A footnote suggests that "[chriminal liability sometimes is still
permitted for 'gross negligence' or a 'gross deviation' from the standard of care of a
reasonable person," as if this were a rare occurrence. Id. at 209 n.3. While it may be
rare under the Model Penal Code, it is a frequent feature of manyjurisdictions' criminal law. See Low ET AL., supra note 68, at 218, 242. For a recent example, see State v.
Hazelwood, 946 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1997).
87 Cf ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 325 (acknowledging as much regarding one
Code complicity provision). Recent research discloses eight states that have substantially enacted Model Penal Code section 2.06(3) & (4), the crucial subsections defining accomplice liability. SeeARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-403 (Michie 1997); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § § 702-222 to -223 (Michie 1994); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 502.020 (Banks-Baldwin
1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.17-A, § 57 (West 1964); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:8
(1996); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-6 (West 1995); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 306 (West
1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.08.020 (West 1988); cf. State v. Baca, No. 25,332,
1997 WL 751264, at *11-12 (N.M. Nov. 13, 1997) (following section 2.06(4) in part);
State v. Carrasco, 946 P.2d 1075, 1079-80 (N.M. 1997) (following section 2.06(3) in
part).
88 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 321-34, 336-55.
89 Id. at 284 n.19.
90 Id. at 345-47, 346 n.4.
91 Id. at 410-12 (explaining the requirement of an "imminent" threat or that the
defendant's act be "immediately necessary").
92 There is no effort to identify the jurisdictions that require imminence. While
the treatise does produce a list of statutes adopting language of immediate necessity,
id. at 410 n.9, the parenthetical years in the statute citations suggest that the list has
not been updated since 1984, when the same citations appeared in Robinson's treatise on criminal law defenses. ROBINSON, supra note 2, § 124(f), at 57 n.38.
Similar over-reliance on the 1984 treatise is detectable in Robinson's treatment of
non-exculpatory defenses such as immunity and the statute of limitations. ROBINSON,
supra note 5, at 576-97; see also infra note 259. The only post-1984 citations are to
subsequent Supreme Court decisions. ROBnNSON,, supra note 5, at 594 nn.89-90, 597
n.111. Regarding immunity in particular, discussion of post-1984 lower court cases
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mostjurisdictions have spumed the Code's choice-of-evils language. 93
States have been similarly slow to embrace the Code's section on the
justifiable use of force to enforce the law,9 4 but Robinson looks solely
to the Code on this topic, 95 slighting non-Code law including the constitutional limitations on such force. 96 On defensive force justifications, most American jurisdictions have not adopted the Code's
limiting provisions; 97 indeed the trend, as exemplified by statutes like
Colorado's "Make My Day" legislation, 98 has been to expand the right
to defensive force. In addition to ignoring such statutes, the treatise
does not consider how non-Code jurisdictions deal with such vexing
questions under the "ordinary" law of defensive force such as the esca-

such as United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir.), modified, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir.
1990), and United States v. Poindexter,951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991), would have been
helpful.
93 Recent research indicates that 14 states have adopted versions of the Code's
choice-of-evils defense; most of these change the provision's language in some signifi-

cant way. See ARc CODE ANN. § 5-2-604 (Michie 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1702 (West 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 463 (1995); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 703302 (Michie 1994); 720 ILL. Con'. STAT. ANN. 5/7-13 (West 1993); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 503.030 (Banks-Baldwin 1995); ME. REv. STAT. ANNi. tit. 17-A, § 103 (West
1964); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.026 (West 1979); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-1407 (1995); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:3 (1996); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05 (McKinney 1998); OR. REv.
STAT. § 161.200 (1990); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 503 (West 1983); TEx. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 9.22 (West 1994).
94 Nine states appear to have adopted the limitations on a private person's use of
force to effect an arrest contained in Model Penal Code section 3.07(2). See ALASA
STAT.

§ 11.81.380 (Michie 1996); CONN.

GEN. STAT. ANN.

§ 53a-22 (West 1994 & Supp.

1997); HAw. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 703-307 (Michie 1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-3
(West Supp. 1997); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 503.090 (Banks-Baldwin 1995); NEB. REv.
STAT. § 28-1412 (1995); N.H. REv. ANN. STAT. § 627:5 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:-7
(West 1995); see also Commonwealth v. Klein, 363 N.E.2d 1313, 1318-19 (Mass. 1977).
Only four states have adopted the limitations on a private person's use of force to
prevent the commission of a crime found in section 3.07(5). See HAw. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 703-308 (Michie 1994); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-1412 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:3-7 (West 1995); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 508 (West 1983); see also infra text
accompanying notes 230-34.

95

ROBINSON,

supra note 5, at 431.

96 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
97 For example, recent research discloses only four states that follow the stringent
limitations on the use of deadly force to defend one's habitation contained in Model
Penal Code section 3.06(3) (d). See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 466 (1995); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 703-306 (Michie 1994); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-1411 (1995); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C: 3-6 (West 1995).
98 See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-704.5 (West 1990), discussed in BONNIE ET AL.,
supra note 13, at 349-50.
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lation of force in a confrontation, 9 9 the use of deadly force to defend
property, 10 0 and the significance of the availability of retreat.' 01
The treatise's sections on excuse defenses are somewhat more
generous in analyzing non-Code law. As previously noted, 10 2 Robinson surveys other tests for insanity; the same is true of involuntariness10 3 and of entrapment.1 0 4 On other excuses, however, the treatise
is less thorough. For example, Robinson treats the invocation of "the
person of reasonable firmness" in the Code's duress defense as if it
were a staple of every jurisdiction's law, 10 5 even though the official
commentary recognizes the language as an innovationl 06-one that
has not been widely adopted. 10 7 Focus on the Model Penal Code simi99 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 437-39.
100 Id. at 443, 445. The treatise does say that "all codes bar the use of deadly force
in defense of property," id. at 443, which is quickly contradicted by the acknowledgment that deadly force may be used to protect the habitation, see id. at 445. The
recent adoption of statutes expanding the justifiable use of deadly force-for example, Louisiana's recent legislation allowing deadly force to prevent car theft, see Rick
Bragg, In Louisiana,Just Assume It's a Gun in Their Pockets, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1997,
§ 4, at 5, availablein 1997 WL 8001583; Law Allows LouisianaMotorists to Shoot Carjackers, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., Aug. 14, 1997, at llA-suggests that Robinson was limiting his statements to legislation based on the Model Penal Code.
101 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 444-45. Again, see supra note 100, Robinson's language seems to encompass all jurisdictions, but he cites only the Model Penal Code
and a case based on it. ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 444 n.20. Inasmuch as most commentators consider the retreat requirement a minority view, see BONNm ET AL., supra
note 13, at 352; DRESSLER, supra note 22, at 203-05, it seems likely that Robinson
meant to describe only the law in Code jurisdictions.
102 See supra text accompanying note 21.
103 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 498-506. One suspects that the treatise attends to
non-Code law on hypnosis as producing involuntary conduct largely because Robinson finds the Code too liberal on this point. Id. at 502-04.
104 Id. at 600-09. But the discussion of non-Code entrapment law has surprising
gaps: there is no treatment of entrapment as a matter of law, especially regarding
Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992), and only one paragraph on the due
process defense. ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 605-06.
105 ROBINSON, supra note 5. at 488, 493-94.
106 Cf MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.09 (Official Craft 1985). Prior
to the Code's promulgation, apparently only Texas' duress statute referred to "a person of ordinary firmness."
107 Recent research indicates that 17 states have enacted a duress defense employing some variation on section 2.09's "person of reasonable firmness" language. See
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-412 (West 1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-208 (Michie 1997);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

§

18-1-708 (West 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§

53a-14 (West

1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 431 (1995); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-231 (Michie
1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-8 (West 1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.090 (BanksBaldwin 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 103-A (West 1964); Mo. ANN. STAT.

§

562.071 (West 1979); N.J.

STAT.

ANN. § 2C:2-9 (West 1995); N.Y.

PENAL

LAW § 40.00
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larly leads to all-too-brief discussions of addiction, 0 8 intolerable
prison conditions, 10 9 and being battered" 0 as constituents of excuse
defenses. The section on mistake of law fails to discuss the limited
extent to which reliance on an official misstatement of law constitutes
a defense in non-Code jurisdictions,"' as well as the penchant of the
2
federal courts to read mistake of law defenses into criminal statutes."
This same section briefly mentions jury nullification, sentencing, and
prosecutorial discretion as possible "amelioration [s]" of rules limiting
mistake of law as a defense" 3-a placement that de-emphasizes the
impact these processes have on all affirmative defenses, from choice4
of-evils to duress."
The Model Penal Code deeply influences the treatise's analysis of
attempt, especially the Code's controversial embrace of "subjective"
liability for inchoate crimes, to the point of punishing attempts to the
same degree as the completed crime because of the primary importance of the actor's intent. 1 5 Robinson acknowledges that most jurisdictions have refused to follow the Code on this matter, 116 but still
overemphasizes its provisions at the expense of contrary law. The
treatise's section on the act requirement for attempt, for example,
does mention the principal non-Code tests, 117 but downplays one of
their major rationales, the desire to preserve a realm of conduct free
(McKinney 1998); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-10 (1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 309 (West 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-5-1 (Michie 1988); TEXAS PENAL CODE
§ 8.05 (West 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-302 (1995). Many of these statutes differ
significantly from section 2.09. See also Williams v. State, 646 A.2d 1101, 1109-10 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (adopting the Code test in part); Commonwealth v. Melzer, 437

N.E.2d 549, 552-54 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (same).
108 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 531.
109

The treatise raises this problem only in a brief footnote, in one of the chapters

onjustification. Id. at 415 n.22. For an interesting discussion of whether this defense
should be characterized as ajustification or as an excuse, see DRESSLER, supranote 22,
at 282-85 (preferring excuse). See also infra text accompanying note 257.
110 ROBINSON, supranote 5, at 567-68 (including articles on battered woman's syndrome in the bibliography to a section entitled "Problematic Excuses"; neither this
section nor any other portion of the treatise directly analyzes defensive use of the
syndrome); see infra text accompanying note 258.
111 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 547-49 & n.18.

112 See, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991).
113 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 552-54.
114 Cf DRESSLER, supra note 22, at 267 (exploring jury nullification in choice-ofevils cases); Low ET AL., supra note 68, at 527-28 (exploring prosecutorial and sen-

tencing discretion in choice-of-evils cases).
115 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 614-16.
116 Id. at 616-17 & n.10.

117 Id. at 624-26 (discussing proximity and res ipsa loquitur).
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from governmental intrusion. 118 This loads the argument in favor of
the Code's substantial step test (which Robinson seems to favor), a
test that attaches criminal liability earlier in the defendant's progress
toward the completed crime.1 1 9 Considering the politicization of
crime in the decades since the Code's promulgation,1 20 it is surprising-and a sign of the Code's relative unimportance-that more jurisdictions have not adopted the substantial step test. 21 Another
example of overemphasis on the Model Penal Code is the treatise's
abbreviated discussion of what it means to say in a non-Code jurisdiction that attempt is a specific intent crime. Robinson asserts that specific intent requires purpose, 122 without considering whether

118 See BONNIE ET AL., supra note 13, at 218-19 (quoting PACKER,supra note 67, at
73-75). Packer's concept of a locus poenitentia is one means of asserting a correspondence between the act requirement generally and the act requirement for attempt.
See supra text accompanying note 71. Robinson nods toward this concept in two brief
footnote references to the work of Andrew Ashworth. ROBINSON, supranote 5, at 625
n.8, 686 n.16.
119

See ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 627-28.

120

See generally KATHERINE BECKETr, MAKING CRIME PAY. LAW AND ORDER IN CON-

TEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS (1997); Sara Sun Beale, What's Law Got to Do with It?
The Political, Socia Psychologicaland Other Non-LegalFactors Influencing the Development of
(Federal)CriminalLaw, 1 BuFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23 (1997).
121 Only Connecticut appears to have adopted the complete definition of a substantial step contained in section 5.01(2). See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 53a-49 (West
1994). Eleven more states require a substantial step that is "strongly corroborative" of
the defendant's culpability, without including section 5.01(2)'s list of conducts that
are sufficient to establish a substantial step if strongly corroborative. See ARxI CODE
ANN. § 5-3-201 (Michie 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 18-2-101 (West 1990 & Supp.
1997); HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 705-500 (Michie 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§ 152 (West 1983 & Supp. 1997); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 564.011 (West 1979); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-201 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 629:1 (1996); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-1
(West 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-01 (1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-101
(1995); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-301 (Michie 1997). Eight more states use the term
"substantial step" without any definition. SeeALASKA STAT. § 11.31.100 (Michie 1996);
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-4-1 (1996); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-4 (West Supp. 1997);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-5-1 (West 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 609.17 (West 1987); OR.
REV. STAT. § 161.405 (1990); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 901 (West 1983); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9A.28.020 (West Supp. 1998). Delaware and Kentucky require a substantial step, but define it more narrowly than the Model Penal Code. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § § 531-532 (1995) ("an act or omission which leaves no reasonable
doubt as to the defendant's intention"); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 506.010 (Michie Supp.
1996) (same). Tennessee's definition of substantial step requires that the defendant's
"entire course of conduct is corroborative of the intent to commit the offense." TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-12-101 (1997).
122

ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 631-32.
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knowledge would also satisfy such a requirement; 123 he also never discusses the question of how this specific intent requirement applies to
124
an attempt to commit a general intent crime.
Parallel deficiencies surface in the sections on conspiracy. The
treatise mentions the traditional requirement of a "bilateral agreement" and the Code's easier-to-prove "unilateral" provision, 125 but
does not indicate the extent of continued adherence to the traditional
approach. 126 There is some discussion of the specific intent requirement for conspiracy under non-Code law, but it is cursory: Whether
knowledge satisfies such a requirement gets only a footnote, and how
the requirement applies to conspiracies to commit general intent
crimes merits just a paragraph.' 2 7 Additionally, Robinson has little to
say about conspiracy's Pinkertondoctrine, 28 other than that the Model
Penal Code does not adopt it.129
123 See SANOwRD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 589 (6th ed. 1995) ("Assume that a defendant, in
order to destroy a competitor's experimental aircraft, plants a bomb on the plane and
sets it to explode in midair, knowing that the test pilot will be killed. The bomb fails
to explode. May the defendant be convicted of attempted murder?").
124 See Low ET AL., supra note 68, at 346-51. The treatise does consider how this
issue would be resolved "under modem statutes." ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 635-36;
see also infra text accompanying notes 195-96.
125 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 648-49.
126 The Code commentary equivocates on this point, noting that many states have
enacted language that could be construed to adopt the unilateral theory of agreement but questioning whether the courts will so construe their statutes. See 2 MODEL
PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Part I, § 5.03, at 398-99 & n.47 (Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1980); see also People v. Foster, 457 N.E.2d 405 (Ill. 1983), discussed
in 1 PAUL MARCUS, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY CASES 2-32 to
2-34 (1997); cf. Dierdre A. Burgman, UnilateralConspiracy:Three CiticalPerspectives, 29
DEPAuL L. REv. 75, 75 n.3 (1979) (reaching a similar conclusion). Marcus notes, "As
a practical matter, the unilateral approach has not had a significant impact on conspiracy prosecutions." MARCUS, supra, at 2-31.
Of the states explicitly considering the unilateral theory in appellate opinions,
four have embraced the theory. See Tidwell v. State, 644 N.E.2d 557, 559 (Ind. 1994);
State v. Drinkard, 750 S.W.2d 630, 635 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Welty, 729 S.W.2d
594, 597 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); People v. Berkowitz, 406 N.E.2d 783, 788 (N.Y. 1980);
State v. Marian, 405 N.E.2d 267 (Ohio 1980). Three states have refused to adopt it.
See Marquiz v. People, 726 P.2d 1105, 1108 n.6 (Colo. 1986); People v. Swerdlow, 647
N.E.2d 1040, 1041-42 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); People v. Breton, 603 N.E.2d 1290, 1294
(Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Fortune v. Commonwealth, 406 S.E.2d 47,49 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
127 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 649-50 & n.22.
128 See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (holding conspirator liable
for the foreseeable crimes of co-conspirators).
129 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 664-65.
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The treatise ends with a substantial section on specific offenses,
the introduction to which again overstates the Code's importance:
MoDEL PENAL CODEINFLvENCE. The definition of specific offenses
in modem American criminal codes has been heavily influenced by
the Model Penal Code. Especially in non-homicide offenses, common law definitions of offenses are now nearly irrelevant; over twothirds of the states model their definitions of offenses after the
130
Code's, with some tracking its language almost verbatim.
The profusion of contemporary criminal statutes that deviate substantially from the Code-rape laws are the best but by no means the
only examples-belies this statement. Consequently, the treatise's
closing section fails in its goal of describing the existing rules of American criminal law.
As the quotation above recognizes, contemporary homicide law
differs considerably from the formulations of the Model Penal Code.
The treatise, however, gives only superficial accounts of the most significant of these differences, provocation in the law of manslaughter,
and premeditation and deliberation in murder.1 3 1 On the former
topic, Robinson mentions the common law's standard of reasonable
provocation, but then misreads it by suggesting it requires "that a reasonable person would have acted the same as the defendant,"'1 2 when
the better view of the test is whether the ordinary or reasonable person would have become impassioned, not whether she would have
killed.' 33 The treatise then shifts to the Code, a pattern repeated in its
treatment of premeditation. After briefly flirting with a few of the
legal issues raised by this requirement, Robinson subsides into a discussion of the Code's rejection of the concept. Other non-Code topics that receive little or no analysis in the treatise are the death
penalty, depraved heart murder,13 4 intent-to-inflict-serious-bodilyharm murder,1 3 5 and misdemeanor manslaughter. 136 Regarding felony murder, Robinson does acknowledge that the Code's radical curtailment of the rule has not been followed, 3 7 but then devotes more
space to speculating why this is true than to describing the ways in
which jurisdictions limit the rule.

38

130

Id. at 703-04 (footnote omitted).

131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138

Id. at 709-11, 715-16.
Id. at 710-11.
See LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 26, at 654-55.
ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 722-23.
Id. at 724.
Id. at 726.
Id. at 730-31.
Compare id at 731-36, with id. at 726-29 & n.4.
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The treatise's sections on offenses less serious than homicide display the same cursory attention to non-Code law. Analysis of alternate
statutory language would have enhanced the discussions of kidnapping, 39 blackmail, 140 and theft, 14 1 as well as the extremely brief treatments of burglary, robbery, theft by extortion, and forgery. 142 But the
clearest example of the treatise's shortchanging non-Code law regarding a substantive crime comes in its section on rape. Most American
jurisdictions have rewritten their rape statutes in the last generation,
and most of these have deviated from the Model Penal Code's provisions; 143 in fact, rejection of the Code's language became a rallying cry
for some reformers.' 44 Yet one reads Robinson's treatise with no real
sense of how events in this area have passed the Code by. There is
brief consideration of non-Code language in one state, 14 5 but the remainder of the discussion focuses on the statute proposed by the
American Law Institute over thirty-five years ago. The result is inadequate analysis of such important topics as mistaken belief in consent, 146 the spousal exemption, 147 and special evidentiary rules for
148
rape cases.
Ironically, the treatise ends with a reference to one of the Code's
most embarrassing provisions, a prohibition against rigging publicly
exhibited contests, 149 added in response to the television quiz show
139

Id. at 744-47. Comparisons to the federal kidnapping statute, 18 U.S.C.

§ 1201 (West 1984 & Supp. 1997), would have been particularly useful.
140 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 748-50. These pages also fail to discuss the extremely interesting theoretical questions about blackmail raised in the articles Robin-

son cites in the bibliography to this section. Id. at 750.
141

Id. at 781-83. For example, Florida's consolidation of theft offenses, see FLA.

§ § 812.012, .014 (West 1994), contrasts sharply with the Model Penal
Code approach. See generally G. Robert Blakey & Michael Goldsmith, CriminalRedistribution of Stolen Property: The Needfor Law Reform, 74 MICH. L. Rxv. 1511 (1976) (providSTAT. ANN.

ing the model for the Florida theft statute).
142 As the apparent reason for curtailed coverage, the treatise in each case suggests that the offenses are unnecessary because other Model Penal Code provisions
cover the conduct. ROBINSON, supranote 5, at 778, 779-80, 788-89, 790-91. Contemplating the electoral fate of a legislator advocating the repeal of such laws, see supra
text accompanying note 120, indicates how far removed from political reality the treatise is.
143 See I MODEL PENAL CODE: AND COMMENTARIES, Part II, § 213.1, at 299-300 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
144 See Leigh Bienen, Rape T - NationalDevelopments in Rape Reform Legislation, 6
WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 170, 175-76 (1980).
145 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 756.
146 Id. at 758 & n.20.
147 Id. at 762-63.
148 Id. at 761-62.
149 Id. at 792.
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scandals of the late 1950s. 150 There is clearly little need for such a
statute in a code intended to transcend the legislative passions of the
moment; that the Code drafters were unable to satisfy their own aspirations in this respect should cause one to ponder the other ways in
which the Model Penal Code is a product of its time, with solutions
that many would consider inappropriate to contemporary America. It
certainly seems that many legislatures and courts have made such a
determination, by refusing to follow the Code's recommendations on
countless occasions. A treatise that largely ignores this phenomenon
can hardly claim to describe accurately the existing rules of American
law.
II
For the reader who accepts the treatise's focus on the Model Penal Code, Criminal Law does a better job of accomplishing its second
stated goal, "to convey ...an understanding of each rule, its application, and the reasoning behind it."' 5 1 Robinson explores most of the
Code's important provisions, delving into its commentaries, both official and unofficial, 152 and assessing the various rationales for the substantive positions it takes. 153
150 See 2 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Part II, § 224.9, at 338 (Official
Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
151 See supra text accompanying note 6.
152 Most sections end with substantial bibliographies, which should prove helpful
to those eager to do further research. There is also a table of authors cited, so that
one can locate Robinson's treatment of a particular author's work.
153 There are a few oversights. Regarding mens rea requirements under the Code,
the treatise could discuss more fully how the definition of knowledge in section
2.02(2) (b) distinguishes between conduct and circumstance elements on the one
hand and result elements on the other. Skimmed over in the text, see ROBINSON, supra
note 5, at 213-14, the distinction appears explicitly only in a graph, id. at 220. Nor is
there discussion of the overlap between the terms "substantial and unjustifiable risk"
and "gross deviation" in the definition of recklessness under section 2.02(2) (c);
Robinson appears to assume that the latter subsumes the former. Id. at 245-46. But
cf BONNIE ET AL., supra note 13, at 143-44 (arguing the contrary). The treatise overlooks the discrepancy between the "gross deviation" necessary for negligence under
section 2.02(2) (d), ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 248, and the unreasonableness standard in mistake defenses, equating the two, id. at 263-64, 462-63, 758 n.20, despite
the fact that a simple deviation from the standard of reasonable care will typically
render a mistake unreasonable. See BONNIE ET AL., supranote 13, at 180-81; DRESSLER,
supra note 22, at 138. And the treatise makes no effort to explain the difference
between "the standard of conduct... [of] a law-abiding person" in the Code's definition of recklessness and "the standard of care . .. [of] a reasonable person" in its
definition of negligence. Id. at 721 n.8; compare ROBINSON, supranote 5, at 246 with id.
at 248.
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As for rule application, the treatise makes extensive use of examstyle hypotheticals, the analysis of which markedly aids reader understanding. 5 4 But Robinson's effort to explain the Code suffers from
the peculiar readings he gives the Code's culpability provisions, especially section 2.02. Because that section occupies such a crucial position in Model Penal Code methodology, the treatise's odd readings of
it and the provisions that build upon it infect the whole work, rendering CriminalLaw considerably less valuable.
Employing reasoning that Robinson and a co-author first
presented in 1983,155 the treatise rightly argues that one of the Code's
most significant advances was to shift the focus of mens rea analysis
from each offense to each element of an offense, 5 6 which section 2.02
accomplishes by the simple device of requiring that some culpability
level (or strict liability) apply "to each material element of the offense." 157 As Robinson notes, one of the principal advantages of element analysis over offense analysis is that it returns the power to
define crimes, including their mental requirements, to the legislature:
[T] he early conceptions of mens rea ... were hopelessly vague and

incomplete. They failed to tell courts enough about the required
culpability for an offense to enable the courts to resolve the cases
that commonly arose. The vague conceptualizations left it to the
courts to fill in the culpability requirements that the statutes did not
provide. Element analysis permits legislatures to reclaim from the
courts the authority to define the conditions of criminal liability. 15 8
The drafters of the Code thus sought to establish in section 2.02
the tools with which the legislature might specify the mens rea for
Looking at other provisions of the Code, Robinson discusses culpability as to the
grade of theft offenses without mentioning section 2.04(2), id. at 786-87, which apparently was drafted to deal with such problems, see 2 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMimARms, Part II, § 223.1, at 144-45 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
Further, he does not consider why section 4.02 requires "a mental disease or defect," a
test under the insanity defense used to screen out less serious mental abnormalities,
see BONNIE Er AL., supra note 13, at 465-66, before such an abnormality may negate a
mental requirement. ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 271-72.
154 Like the examination questions of many law professors (including me), Robinson's hypotheticals are occasionally somewhat puerile. Characters are gratuitously
portrayed as undereducated with weak or obscene vocabularies. Id. at 295-96,
321-22, 435-36, 469-70. Another hypo envisions "retarded men" playing "strip-baseball and tackle-badminton." Id- at 336-37. Also like other law professors, Robinson's
hypotheticals can be outdated. Id. at 669-70 (discussing a draft resister), 679-80 (occurring in 1974).
155 Robinson & Grail, supra note 9, at 682-85, 691-94, 703-04.
156 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 210-11.

157
158

§ 2.02(1) (Official Draft 1985).
supra note 5, at 210-11 (footnote omitted).
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each material element of every offense: the four levels of culpabilitypurpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence' 59-and two rules
about how to read offenses that are silent1 60 or ambiguous 161 with regard to culpability. It is in explaining these provisions-specifically,
the definition of recklessness and the interaction of the subsections
regarding statutes that are silent or ambiguous regarding mens reathat the treatise propounds rules of law that reintroduce vagueness
and incompleteness to culpability analsis and thus foster judicial usurpation of the legislative function. So, Robinson's interpretation of
section 2.02 serves to undermine the accomplishments of the element
analysis he champions.
My central quarrel with the treatise's explication of section 2.02 is
its insistence that the Code's definition of recklessness is incomplete.
To reach this conclusion, Robinson begins with the decision of the
Code's drafters to categorize each material element of an offense as
conduct, circumstance, or result. 16 2 As the treatise accurately notes,
this decision generates problems because of the drafters' failure to
define these categories; definitions appear necessary because without
them it is difficult to classify correctly many elements of particular
crimes.' 6 3 One way to minimize such problems is to attribute little
practical significance to the distinctions among conduct, circumstance, and result. 164 The treatise, instead, magnifies these problems
by insisting that recklessness, the most frequent minimum culpability
requirement in the Code, 165 applies differently to conduct elements
on the one hand and to circumstance and result elements on the
other.
Robinson reaches this conclusion because of what he sees a defect in the Code's definition of recklessness: "[N] ote that the Code
does not expressly define 'recklessness' . . . with respect to a conduct

element."' 6 6 He would fill this gap by reading recklessness to require
159 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (a)-(d) (Official Draft 1985); see also id.
§ 2.02(5) (establishing a hierarchical arrangement among the four culpability levels).
Regarding strict liability, see id. § 2.05.
160 See id. § 2.02(3).

161

See id. § 2.02(4).

162 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 149-50 (discussing MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(9)
(Official Draft 1985)).
163 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 150-51 (questioning the categorization of "kills,"
"obstructs," "destroys," "falsifies," "mutilates," "desecrates," "compels," and "agrees").
164 Cf BONNIE ET AL., supra note 13, at 138, 143 (making light of the distinctions
among conduct, circumstance, and result, especially in the definitions of purpose and

knowledge because few Code crimes require purpose).
165 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 229.
166 Id. at 219. The same comment applies to the definition of negligence.
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knowledge when applied to a conduct element, because "the drafters
determined that, as a practical matter,... recklessness... as to conduct is [not] likely to arise-that is, it is unlikely that a person would
67
not at least know the nature of the conduct they were performing.'
This reasoning ignores the plain language of the Code's definition of recklessness, which makes no effort to distinguish among conduct, circumstance, and result elements, instead treating them all
equivalently:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an
offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that,
considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the
circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation
from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would ob168
serve in the actor's situation.
That these words apply to conduct, circumstance, and result elements equally is made crystal clear by the official commentary to the
Code: "Whether the risk relates to the nature of the actor's conduct,
or to the existence of the requisite attendant circumstances, or to the
result that may ensue, is immaterial; the concept is the same, and is
thus defined to apply to any material element." 169 Though the treatise concedes that the definition of recklessness might be read as this
commentary implies, 170 it nevertheless persists in contending that
recklessness requires proof of knowledge when applied to a conduct
71
element.'
167 d. Again, see supranote 166, the comment also applies to negligence. See also
id. at 220-21. Notice how this reasoning resembles the policy analysis used by courts
in non-Code jurisdictions to determine the mens rea for a particular statute, as they
decide what culpability level "makes sense" in the context of the particular crime. See
id. at 211 n.15 (noting that courts "continue to define unstated culpability requirements according to their own view of the public policy interests").
168 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (c) (Official Draft 1985). A linguistic argument
favoring Robinson's reading is that the verb "exists" applies to circumstances and the
verb cluster "will result" to results, leaving no verb for conduct elements. But conduct
"exists" just as clearly as a circumstance might. Further, it is no more reasonable to
say that the first sentence of the definition does not apply to conduct because conduct
elements are not directly mentioned than it would be to say that the second sentence

does not apply to result elements, because it mentions conduct and circumstances but

not results.
169 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Part I,
Draft and Revised Comments 1985).

170

ROBINSON,

§ 2.02, at 236-37 (Official

supra note 5, at 219-20.

171 See, e.g., id. at 228-29 ("[B]ecause the Code fails to define 'recklessness' as to
conduct, ... [ § 2.02(3)] is frequently interpreted to read in 'knowing' with respect to
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By defining recklessness in this way, the treatise makes the classification of elements as conduct (as opposed to circumstance or result)
quite important in crimes with a minimum culpability of recklessness.
Robinson attempts to solve the problem he has thus created by advocating a narrow definition of conduct, "to include only literally the
conduct (muscular movement) of the actor,' 72 thus leaving most of
the elements of the offense in the circumstance and result categories.
As an example of this narrow definition, the treatise construes a statute punishing one who "obstructs a public roadway" to include the
"conduct, whatever the particular actions might be, that caused the
obstruction (a result) of a public roadway (a circumstance)."173 This

contradicts the far more straightforward reasoning that "obstructs" is a
conduct element while "public" and "roadway" state circumstance elements; besides common sense, this approach also has the virtue of
diminishing the significance of causation analysis, which remains
74
fraught with difficulty, even under the Code.
The treatise frankly encourages courts similarly to recast conduct
elements as results (or circumstances) 75 without regard to how this
activity undermines one of the main virtues of element analysis. Regarding crimes of recklessness, courts can use (or forgo) this power
and thereby manipulate the culpability required (assuming that recklessness requires knowledge when applied to a conduct element); this
judicial authority approximates the culpability-defining power courts
have under offense analysis, allowing judges effectively to usurp the
legislative role. A reading of the definition of recklessness in section
2.02 as applying identically to conduct, circumstances, and results obviates the need to distinguish among those categories 176 and thus restricts the courts' role in determining the mental requirements of
criminal statutes.
Just as Robinson's treatise misreads the definition of recklessness,
it misunderstands the relationship between section 2.02's provisions
on offenses that are silent or ambiguous with regard to culpability,
all conduct elements."). The only support for this statement is the unilluminating
parenthetical "(This is discussed in greater detail later.)" Id. at 229.
172

Id. at 221; see also id. at 152-53.

173 Id. at 221-22; see also id. at 152-53. So if recklessness were the minimum culpability applicable to this offense, under Robinson's interpretation of recklessness, the
prosecution would have to prove that the defendant knew he was doing those acts and
that he was reckless with regard to whether they would obstruct a public highway.
174
175

See supra text accompanying note 29.
ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 236-37.

176 As previously noted, see supra note 164, the practical impact of the distinctions
among such elements in the definitions of purpose and knowledge can be minimized
by the definition of the mental requirement in particular crimes.
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and again the error expands the courts' ability to redraft the mental
requirements in criminal statutes. The subsection on crimes silent
with regard to culpability, section 2.02(3), requires that a court read
in a minimum requirement of recklessness; 77 the subsection on ambiguous mens rea provisions, section 2.02 (4), enjoins a court to apply
a culpability term used "without distinguishing among the material
elements" of a statute to all the statute's material elements "unless a
contrary purpose plainly appears."1 78 The treatise expresses fear that
application of section 2.02 (4) will result in crimes that are too difficult
to prove (when purpose or knowledge would apply to all the elements) or too easy (when negligence would apply), 179 and so advocates an interpretive policy that restricts the scope of section
2.02(4)-"to the grammatical clause in which the stated term appears"' 80-in order to allow a broader sway for the recklessness standard of section 2.02(3).81

Of course, section 2.02(4) does not contain this "grammatical
clause" limitation, and there is reason to believe that the drafters of
the Code would disagree with Robinson's applications of the subsection: for example, that recklessness is the minimum culpability applicable to "falsifies" in "A person commits a misdemeanor if, knowing
that he has no privilege to do so, he falsifies, destroys, removes or
conceals any writing or record, with purpose to deceive or injure anyone or to conceal any wrongdoing."1 8 2 A better analysis-one more
faithful to the language of section 2.02 (4)-would be that while "purpose" applies only to deceiving, injuring, or concealing (because it is
an additional mental requirement that applies to no part of the act
requirement), "knowing" clearly applies to one element of the act requirement (the lack of privilege), and because no contrary purpose
plainly appears, knowledge should also apply to falsifying, destroying,
83
removing, or concealing any writing or record.'
177 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (Official Draft 1985).
178 See id. § 2.02(3), (4).
179 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 238-39.
180

Id. at 239.

181 Id. at 239-42.
182 Id. at 227; see also id. at 231-32, 240-42; id. at 740 n.18 (misapplying section
2.02(4) to causing bodily harm with a deadly weapon); cf.id. at 780-81 (misapplying
section 2.02(3) to robbery); id. at 786 (overlooking the mens rea impact on theft
offenses of the definition of "deprive").
183 Cf BoNm ET AL., supra note 13, at 147-48 (reaching the same conclusion
regarding a similar statute); 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES,Part I, § 2.02,
at 245-46 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985) (similar examples). A third

interpretation of section 2.02(4) would apply purpose to all the elements of the offense except the lack of privilege. While it is evident that the drafters of the Code did
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In a footnote, Robinson indicates that his reason for favoring section 2.02 (3) over section 2.02 (4) is that the former provision "reflects
the element analysis approach adopted" by the Code, while the latter
'18 4
"is characteristic of an offense analysis model of offense definition.
In other words, restricting the application of a stated culpability level
across all elements of an offense will result in more crimes with differing culpability requirements applying to their various elements.
While one may doubt whether such complexity is valuable, a more
significant question arises regarding the source of the complexity: the
treatise seems to overlook that courts, not legislatures, will create
these differing culpability levels, that judges interpreting statutory ambiguities will have the power to define mens rea by manipulating the
grammatical clause limitation on section 2.02(4), and that the door
will thus be open for judicial assumption of the legislative right to
define criminal conduct.
The treatise provides examples of this undermining of one of the
principal benefits of element analysis. In interpreting the Code's provision on crime committed through an innocent agent-"A person is
legally accountable for the conduct of another when ... acting with

the kind of culpability that is sufficient for commission of the offense,
he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct." 85-Robinson
invites courts to apply the recklessness requirement of section 2.02(3) to the element "causes" even if the offense
committed requires purpose as to each of its elements.18 6 It is difficult
to imagine that the legislature, in passing a statute punishing purposeful commission of a crime, meant to criminalize a person who
wanted the crime to occur but caused it only recklessly.18 7 Another
example of the treatise's favoritism of section 2.02(3) over section
2.02(4)-and of the room this favoritism leaves for judicial legislation-arises in its discussion of homicide. Robinson prefers that recklessness be the culpability level for the human being element in all
homicides, even though murder, manslaughter, and negligent hominot intend this result, see sources cited supra, it is also evident that the language of
section 2.02(4) does not plainly exclude the interpretation. This ambiguity is one of
the major failings of section 2.02.
184 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 244 n.31.
185 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(2) (a) (Official Draft 1985).
186 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 341-42 & n.14.
187 The official commentary to the Code disapproves any such reading of the statute: "A defendant is accountable for the behavior of an innocent or irresponsible
person when he has caused such behavior to occur, provided he has caused it with the
purpose, knowledge, recklessness or negligence that the law requires for the commission of the crime with which he has been charged." 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Part I, § 2.06, at 302 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
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cide each have different culpability levels that would apply to that element. 8 8 A court following this invitation would be substituting its
judgments of wise policy for those of the legislature.'8 9
In construing and applying section 2.02, CriminalLaw advocates
interpretations that increase the power of courts to define the mens
rea requirements of crimes, where more straightforward interpretations would not. The same tendency is evident in the treatise's treatment of those Code provisions setting the culpability for complicity,
attempt, and conspiracy. Using the analytic tools provided by section
2.02, each such provision requires purpose, but the treatise questions
how this requirement applies to the elements of the offense the defendant aided, attempted, or conspired to commit. If a lower culpability level would have applied to one committing the offense, is this
lower culpability "elevated" to purpose for the accomplice, attempter,
or conspirator? Whenever he can, Robinson argues against such elevation, largely limiting the purpose requirement to conduct elements
(and thus exacerbating further the thorny problem of distinguishing
among conduct, circumstances, and results);190 his narrow definition
of conduct' 9 1 reduces the impact of the purpose language even
further.
As for complicity, the treatise concedes that an accomplice must
purposely assist the conduct of the perpetrator of the crime, but argues that regarding results and circumstances, the accomplice need
188 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 708 n.4.
189 Assault with a deadly weapon under the Code provides a similar example. The
treatise argues that recklessness should apply to the deadly weapon element, even
though negligence is the only stated mental requirement in the offense. Id. at 243
n.30.

190

See supra text accompanying notes 164-65. The difficulty of distinguishing

these elements appears quite clearly in Robinson's discussion of impossibility as a
defense to liability for attempt. He argues that element analysis can separate factual
from legal impossibility The former relates to conduct and result elements, and the

latter to circumstance elements. ROBINSON, supranote 5, at 683. The following example is meant to illuminate the distinction:
Shooting a stuffed deer out of season, for example, is a legally impossible
attempt because shooting a live deer (conduct and circumstance) is the prohibition of the offense. If the offense were defined to prohibit killing a deer,
the same shooting of a stuffed deer would be judged a factual impossibility
because a required result is missing-namely death. It is understandable,
then, that before the more systematic analysis of offense elements came into
being with the drafting of modem codes, the legal-factual impossibility dis-

tinction seemed somewhat vague and unpredictable.
Id. at. 684. Even with modem codes the distinction remains "somewhat vague and
unpredictable." Id.
191 See supra text accompanying notes 172-73.
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only manifest whatever culpability the perpetrator must show. 92 As
far as results are concerned, this conclusion is not controversial, as the
Code specifically allows it.19 3 However, the Code's complicity section
is silent regarding circumstance elements, and one would have assumed that in the face of this silence the section's general language
"with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the
offense, 1 94 as well as the common law rule elevating circumstance elements at least to knowledge, 195 would have controlled. But instead
Robinson says that " [t] he better view"' 9 6 is that the culpability level for
circumstance elements not be elevated, giving reasoning much like
one would expect from a common law court explaining its version of
1 97

wise policy.

Similar policy reasoning appears in the treatise's recommendations regarding attempt. Building on his discussion of complicity,
Robinson advocates a "narrow interpretation"'' 9 8 of attempt's requirement of purpose because it is "the more sound position":

99

"[I] t need

not be shown that the actor was purposeful as to every circumstanceand
result of the substantive offense." 200 But this is not the Code's rule,
which rather plainly applies attempt's purpose requirement to conduct and result elements of the completed crime, but not to its circumstances. 20 ' So the treatise invites courts to depart from the Code's
192 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 330-32, 333, 334.
193 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(4) (Official Draft 1985).
194 Id. at § 2.06(3) (a).
195 See ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 327-29, 334.
196 Id. at 333.
197 Id.; see also id. at 331-32.
198 Id. at 634.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 634-35.
201 See 2 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES, Part I, § 5.01, at 301 (Official Draft
and Revised Comments 1985). This elevation of the mental requirement accords with
the Code's treatment of simple assault, as specifically noted by Robinson:
The culpability requirements for simple assault differ depending on whether
the bodily injury or physical menacing form is used. Where the actor causes
bodily injury, he or she must do so purposely, knowingly, or recklessly, or
negligently with a deadly weapon. If the assault is premised on physical menacing to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily harm but causes no
bodily injury, then the actor must do so purposely. Presumably, the drafters
are concerned that, in the absence of physical injury and in the absence of a
high culpability level, the offense conduct may be too trivial to merit the
condemnation of criminal conviction.
ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 741 (footnotes omitted). The same reasoning justifies raising the mental requirement for attempt above that for the completed crime, as
Holmes recognized long ago in explaining why attempt was a specific intent crime.
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language in order to achieve "more sound" results, precisely the sort
of behavior that the Code was designed to prevent.
This line of reasoning reaches its crisis when the treatise turns to
conspiracy, where the Code requires that the defendant act "with the
purpose of promoting or facilitating ...

commission"20 2 of the crime

that is the object of the conspiracy, without distinguishing among the
material elements of the object crime. Despite the fact that this language applies equally to conduct, circumstance, and result elements,
Robinson doggedly insists that "[a] better interpretation of the Code's
'purpose' requirement . . .is to require only that it be the actor's
'20 3
purpose that the conduct constituting the object offense be performed.
2
04
While this view is challengeable as a matter of policy, a more important reason why a court should not adopt it is that it is inconsistent
20 5
with the language chosen by the legislature.
While it opens the way for judicial legislation, CriminalLaw's approach to the culpability required for complicity, attempt, and conspiracy has the virtue of consistency, as does the treatise's narrow
definition of conduct and its favoritism for section 2.02(3) over section 2.02(4). But such consistency is inappropriate even to the Model
Penal Code, which like any product of human cooperation, contains
inconsistent

and contradictory

aspects. 2 06

Robinson's effort

to

smooth out these inconsistencies reflects his desire to systematize
criminal law, which produces another set of problems for the reader
of his treatise.
O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 65-68, 70-72 (1881), quoted in Low ET AL., supra
note 68, at 230-31.
202 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02(1) (Official Draft 1985).
203 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 654.
204 The treatise argues for a low mental requirement for conspiracy because the
defendant's agreement "show[s] unequivocal criminal intent. The agreement requires that the actor agree that a criminal offense be committed. This leaves little
room for ambiguity about whether the intended objective is criminal." Id. at 653; see
also id. at 645. Such reasoning ignores the ease of proving an agreement under the
Code, which may be "tacit" and "unilateral," see id. at 646-47, 648-49-a requirement
Robinson characterizes as "slim," id. at 647.
205 The same sort of reasoning, with the same faults, appears in the treatise's discussion of the mental requirement for solicitation. Id. at 674-76.
206 The treatise admits as much, repeatedly noting that some general Code provisions assume that crimes have only one culpability level, as if element analysis of mens
rea were not possible under the Code. Id. at 240, 340, 389-90, 463-64; see also id. at
739 n.13 (suggesting lack of coordination between grading provisions for attempt and
aggravated assault). Regarding the purpose requirement for complicity, attempt, and
conspiracy under the Code, it might be preferable simply to acknowledge that the
Code applies that requirement differently for each form of liability and that the provisions are therefore not well coordinated.
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III

The third stated goal of CriminalLaw is to "convey... a conceptual framework of criminal law that explains the interrelations among
the rules. ' 20 7 Not content with a single framework, the treatise
presents multiple schemata-frames within frames-to explain the interrelation of virtually all facets of criminal law doctrine. While these
comparisons produce some fascinating insights (almost all of which
Robinson has previously developed in other works), they ultimately
contort the law in a number of areas in order to fit the framework
suggested. The resulting portrait fills the frame, but misses much of
the reality of contemporary criminal law.
According to its introduction, the treatise aims to show that "each
rule serves as only a piece of a larger machine for determining criminal liability. '208 Robinson builds this machine by deploying a "doctrinal structure":
Each doctrine [of criminal law] typically does one of three things:
(1) it may define What constitutes an offense, (2) or it may define the

conditions under which an actor will be acquitted even though he
or she satisfies the elements of an offense-such a doctrine typically
is called a defense; (3) or it may define the conditions under which
an actor will be held liable even though he or she does not satisfy
the elements of an offense. Such a doctrine may be called a doctrine
of imputation. This treatise is organized around this doctrinal
209
structure.
Criminal Law treats offense doctrines in the expected fashion,
with chapters on the act and mental requirements. 21 0 But in these

chapters, as well as in subsequent ones, the treatise applies competing
schemes, a "function [al]" analysis of criminal law doctrines identifying
rules of conduct, liability, and grading, 21 ' and a contrast of the objective and subjective views of criminality. 212 These counterstructures,
which cut across the doctrinal framework, 218 concededly raise nice
questions, but nevertheless complicate the workings of the criminal
law machine, rendering it more difficult to conceptualize.
207 See supra text accompanying note 6.
208 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at xvi. The resulting "conceptual framework... may
be the book's most important contribution." Id.
209 Id. at 41.
210 But see supra text accompanying note 73.
211 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 50-63, 143-45, 246 n.7.
212 Id. at 133-37.
213 See id. at 323-25, 347, 382-84 & n.4, 445-46, 456-60 & n.18, 649, 672-73, 680,
690-91, 696, 698, 699, 772-73, 782 n.1.
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Perhaps the chapters on offense doctrines can bear the complexity, but the load becomes too heavy as the treatise presents its unorthodox discussions of defense and imputation doctrines. After act
and mental requirement, the treatise turns to imputation, which for
Robinson comprehends notjust accomplice liability and related rules,
but also voluntary intoxication, transferred intent, substituted culpability (as in the lesser-legal-wrong rule), felony murder, corporate liability, possession offenses, status offenses, strict liability, and the use of
presumptions.2 14 CriminalLaw acknowledges the reader's likely reaction to this profusion:2 15 "Given the variety of rules and doctrines of
imputed liability, it is not obvious that there is any common theme in
their supporting rationales. '216 Such a reaction is appropriate; while
the notion that each of these doctrines has an aspect of imputation is
illuminating, grouping them together produces a grab bag that creates more confusion than it dispels.
The clearest example of this fault is voluntary intoxication. Its
significance is disproof of the mental requirement, but the treatise's
chapter on mens rea does not discuss voluntary intoxication, even
though that chapter considers both mistake and mental illness as
means of disproving culpability.2 1 7 Robinson saves intoxication for his

chapters on imputation, because when courts refuse to allow a defendant to use voluntary intoxication to disprove a mental requirement,
they can be said to impute that mental requirement to the defendant.218 The treatise criticizes the resulting equation of the culpability

of becoming intoxicated to the mens rea necessary for the crime, arguing instead that courts should "assess[ ] an actor's culpability as to
the elements of the offense at the time he or she becomes intoxicated."2 19 While this is a point worth pondering, it casts little light on
currently applicable law, where the trend favors diminishing the effect
of voluntary intoxication, whether imputation under Robinson's stan214 Id. at 281-89.
215 Id. at 280-81; see also id. at 289-92 (identifying four theories supporting
imputation).
216 Id. at 289.
217 Id at 259-75. The only mention of voluntary intoxication appears in the discussion of using mental illness to disprove mens rea: "The common law treated diminished capacity as analogous to voluntary intoxication, but the analogy is flawed." Id. at
272; see also id. at 272-73. Without any concurrent discussion of intoxication, it is
difficult to see how a reader would understand the point being made.
218 Id. at 312.
219 Id. at 317-18. This contention "is a specific application of a general theory for
dealing with an actor who causes the conditions of his or her own defense." Id. at 318
n.34.
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dard is appropriate or not.220 So delaying consideration of voluntary

intoxication sacrifices understanding of current law in order to maintain fidelity to a conceptual framework that aggrandizes imputation
doctrines. Similarly, comprehension of criminal law is advanced little
by treating transferred intent as an imputation doctrine, 221 rather
than as an aspect of causation, nor is there much value in placing the
treatise's discussion of inculpatory mistakes2 22 in the imputation chapters instead of in the chapter on culpability.
While the chapters on imputation are unusual in content, the
chapters on defenses are unusual in the intricacy of their theoretical
explications; the criminal law machine grows even more complex at
this point. 223 The treatise forgoes the usual division of doctrines of
defense into justification and excuse, 224 instead adumbrating five categories of defenses: "absent-element defenses, offense modifications,
justifications, excuses, or nonexculpatory defenses." 225 The treatise
then asserts an "internal structure" for the two most important categories: "Triggering conditions permit a necessary and proportional response,"' 22 6 for justifications, while for excuses, "[a] disability or
reasonable mistake must cause an excusing condition."227 Each of these
structures has substructures, wheels within wheels. For example, the
clash between "the reasons theory of justification" and "the deeds the' 2 28
ory"
animates much of that body of doctrine, while the explication
of excuse returns frequently to the Model Penal Code's standard of
229
"the person of reasonable firmness."
In his zeal to make the law ofjustification fit the system thus created, Robinson de-emphasizes some justification defenses and distorts
220 The Supreme Court's approval in Montana v. Egelhoff, 578 U.S. 37 (1996), of a
statute prohibiting the use of voluntary intoxication to disprove mens rea should spur

some jurisdictions to adopt similar laws, despite the treatise's protests. One jurisdiction that has already done so is Hawaii, whose law on this point Robinson misstates.
Compare ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 317 n.31, with HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 702-230
(Michie 1994).
221 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 295-300.
222 Id. at 301-07.
223 The imputation doctrines also display a share of theoretical complexity. See
supra notes 215 & 219.

224 See BONNIE ET AL., supra note 13, at 324-35.
225 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 379; see also id. at 43-47.
226 Id. at 404; see also id. at 423.
227

Id. at 480.

228 Id. at 453; see also id. at 471-75.
229 Id. at 488 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (Official Draft 1985)); id. at 5,
at 489, 493-94, 503, 532-33, 536-39, 559, 564-65. See supra text accompanying notes
105-07 and infra text accompanying notes 240-44.
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others. -A private citizen's use of force to prevent the commission of
crime does not fit any of the treatise's paradigms, 23 0 so it is mentioned
only in passing, first as an "exception[ ]" to "[t]he rule that limits public authority justifications to a special class of persons,"23 1 and then in
a paragraph that focuses almost all of its attention on the prevention
of suicide. 232 A reader will thus search in vain for an adequate account of the current status of the first justification, the "perfect" defense from which the "imperfect" defense of self-protection arose, 233 a
23 4
justification that contemporary legislatures continue to expand.
Another justification defense that fails to fit the treatise's system
is mistaken belief in justifying facts. Robinson argues for a rigorous
distinction between justification and excuse, or what he calls "objective" and "subjective justifications," 235 but this requires classifying as
an excuse what both the common law and the Model Penal Code recognize as a justification-a mistaken belief in facts that would justify
the defendant's conduct. 236 While others have contended that there
is a reason for the prevailing characterization, that the line between
230 The use of force isjustified, even if not necessary, for example, in the case of a
witness to the crime. Moreover, the force used need not be proportional: contemporary law justifies the use of deadly force to prevent the commission of many felonies
that do not threaten life. See DRESSLER, supra note 22, at 252-53. See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME Is NOT THE PROBLEM: LETHiAL VIOLENCE IN
AMERICA 167-69 (1997)

(questioning the likelihood of limiting the use of deadly
force in crime prevention to situations involving threats of death or bodily injury):
[T]he justifiable use of deadly force by police and private citizens is a largescale enterprise in the United States ....
...
[C]itizens are frequently eager to use lethal force in crime prevention
whenever they think it is allowed.
One reason why further restrictions on the use of deadly force are not likely
is a long tradition of public approval for violent citizen self-defense against

property felons.
Id.
231 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 424; see also id. at 425 & n.6.
232 Id. at 432-33.
233 See Low ET AL., supra note 68, at 541 n.b.
234 See supra text accompanying note 98 and note 100.
235 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 456; see also id. at. 456-60 & n.18; see also id. at 455
(characterizing these as "privileged" and "unprivilegedjustification[s]"). This distinction is necessary to support the treatise's previous assertion that justifiable (but not

excused) aggression may not be resisted. Id. at 439-40.
236 Non-Code jurisdictions require a reasonable mistake, see LAFAvE & ScoTr,
supranote 26, at 457, while the Code requires a mistake that negatives the culpability
necessary for the crime, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09(2) (Official Draft 1985).
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justification and excuse in this context is not so clear, 237 Robinson
rejects this argument, preferring clarity in his system to the inevitable
23 8
messiness of life and law.
CriminalLaw's preference for a mechanistic system over the relative chaos of organic growth 239 becomes most apparent, and most inappropriate, when the treatise turns to excuses. Throughout a long
chapter, Robinson struggles to conform the recognized excuses to his
paradigm, but the effort is unpersuasive. The law's recognition of excuses has been too ad hoc to submit to the sort of systematizing he
favors.
At the outset, his proposed structure for excuse-"A disability or
reasonable mistake must cause an excusing condition"24 0 -seems both ungainly, in harnessing the disparate categories of disability and reasonable mistake, and inadequate, because of the generality of "excusing
condition." While reasonable reliance on an official misstatement of
the law is surely an excuse defense, 241 it seems quite a stretch to analogize it to the M'Naghten test for insanity because they both produce
the same excusing condition, that "the actor accurately perceives and
understands the physical nature of the conduct and its consequences
but does not know that the conduct is wrong or criminal. '24 2 This
excusing condition is one of a hierarchy of four 243 tailored to fit involuntariness and the various forms of the insanity defense, but which
accommodates other excuses rather poorly. For example, the treatise
acknowledges that the immaturity defense requires no excusing con244
dition at all.

237

See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 855-75 (1978), cited in

supra note 5, at 447 n.25; Kent Greenawalt, The PerplexingBorders ofJustification andExcuse, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 1919-20 (1984), cited in ROBINSON, supranote
5, at 459 n.17.
238 ROBINSON, supranote 5, at 447 n.26 ("[T]o avoid the confusion of justification
and excuse," a different name should be found for the defense based on mistaken
belief in justifying facts.).
239 See generally id. at 704.
240 Id. at 480.
241 See id. at 544-54.
242 Id. at 483; see also id. at 485. Because mistaken belief in justifying facts cannot
be ajustification, see supra text accompanying notes 235-38, the treatise puts it in the
same excuse category with reasonable reliance on an official misstatement of the law;
see id. at 484-85. The analogy to insanity is even more forced for this defense.
243 See id. at 482-83.
244 Id. at 485-86, 533-36.
ROBINSON,
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Nor does the excuse paradigm fit very well the less rigorous conceptions of involuntariness. 45 Robinson characterizes lack of voluntariness as "the catchall excuse" because "the law does not impose a
specific disability requirement," 24 6 thus undercutting its fit with the
internal structure he asserts for excuse defenses. Plainly dissatisfied
with the extent to which some courts and legislatures have stretched
involuntariness, 2 4 7 he manages to cabin the excuse to suit his taste
only by imposing an objective standard, "requir[ing] ... a comparison

of the actor's conduct to that of the reasonable person in the same
situation."2 48 Though not included in its paradigm of excuse, the
treatise imports this standard from the Model Penal Code's provision
on duress and generalizes it to all excuses.2 49 The problem with this
generalization is that "[n] ot every excuse defense includes in its legal
formulation an objective standard," 250 especially not involunariness or
insanity. The treatise lamely argues that the results under these de-

25 1
without comfenses conform to those under an objective standard,

menting on the manifest circularity ofjustifying an objective standard
by saying it conforms to the results under existing law and then using
that standard to modify the results under the existing law of involuntariness. Thus the treatise contorts both its own model for excuses and
the law of such excuses in a vain attempt to achieve order in an unruly
area of criminal law.
The treatise resorts to this objective standard to justify limitations
Robinson favors in the excuse defenses based on subnormality, involuntary intoxication, and addiction, 252 as well as to reject excuses
Robinson labels "problematic": chromosomal abnormality, brain2 53
washing, cultural indoctrination, and rotten social background.
The summarizing paragraph that concludes the latter section asserts
generally: "To merit excuse, an actor must show that his or her disability so significantly reduced the capacity to avoid the violation that the
245 The very existence of such an excuse taxes the treatise's organizational structure, which initially treats a voluntary act as part of the act requirement, id. at 183-87,
but then decides that its lack is better conceptualized as an excuse defense, id. at
185-86, 504-06. The waters are muddied a bit further by a footnote to the discussion
of involuntariness as a defense suggesting that perhaps it should be considered as part
of the culpability requirement. Id. at 505 n.28.

246 Id. at 499.
247 Id. at 499-504.

248 Id. at 501; see also id. at 503 (applying this standard).
249
250
251
252
253

Id. at 486-91, 493-94; see infra note 255.
RoBINSON, supra note 5, at 488.
Id. at 488-89.
Id. at 530-33.
Id. at 556-65.
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actor cannot reasonably have been expected to have acted otherwise."2 54 Though there may be many good reasons to limit or to reject
each member of this disparate set of excuses, it seems tendentious to
identify the failure of an objective standard as the master explanation.
Even duress, the excuse defense that most clearly applies an objective standard (if only in its Model Penal Code formulation 25 5), does
not fit the model for excuses on which the treatise grafts such a standard. Coercion is offered as duress' disability, 25 6 but Robinson
acknowledges:
[C] oercion by itself does a poor job at serving the functions of a
disability: It does little to signal the actor as abnormal or different
from the rest of the population and also does little to provide an
obvious and continuing cause to which to shift the blame for the
violation.

257

Furthermore, duress requires no "independent excusing condition."258 So both ends of the excuse paradigm are only faintly present
in the defense of duress.
The treatise's emphasis on its structure for excuse also produces
some significant omissions. Entrapment is banished to the chapter on
nonexculpatory defenses 259 because it does not fit the excuse para26 1
digm, 260 thus losing the opportunity for interesting comparisons.
Similarly, escape from intolerable prison conditions rates only a footnote in the justification chapter, even though it is more profitably analyzed as an excuse defense. 2 62 And Robinson does not discuss
whether jurisdictions are developing a new version of duress applicable to battered women who assist their batterers in committing
254 Id. at 565.
255 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (Official Draft 1985) (applying the standard
of "a person of reasonable firmness"); see supra text accompanying notes 105-07.
256

See ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 536.

257 Id. at 537.
258 Id.
259 One anomaly in this chapter is its identification of incompetency to stand trial,
which can produce at most a dismissal of criminal charges, not an acquittal, as a "defense." Id. at 593-97. Another is Robinson's willingness to give prosecutors discretion to initiate proceedings barred by the statute of limitations, id. at 577-79, which
comes only a few pages after he condemns reliance on prosecutorial discretion as a
substitute for another excuse defense, because such reliance is inconsistent with the
legality principle, id. at 552-54.
260 Id. at 606-09.
261 See BONNIE ET AL., supra note 13, at 417.
262 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 415 n.22; see also supra note 109.
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crime,2 63 perhaps because such a defense would deviate even further

from his proposed structure.
The possible emergence of such a defense exemplifies the chaotic nature of excuses in contemporary criminal law: they are a varied
lot, a congeries of distinct doctrines, each produced by different histories and responding to different social needs. Defining a general theory of excuses thus inevitably will misportray current law. Robinson
nevertheless pursues the chimera of "a single general excuse defense," 2 6 because he considers the exposition of such a conceptual
framework his duty.265 Here, as in imputation and justification chap-

ters of the treatise, discharging this duty to describe the criminal law
"machine" produces a contraption that may well not work, but that in
any event bears too little resemblance to criminal law as it actually
exists.
IV
The inadequacies of a legal treatise, no matter how important the
subject or how eminent the author, are a relatively minor concern.
Students and teachers can simply avoid the work, especially if there
are other options in the field. 2 66 A more important reason for highlighting deficiencies in a recently published treatise is that it may reflect prevalent styles of teaching the subject; if so, the book's defects
may disclose deficiencies in the learning of thousands of lawyers and
lawyers-to-be.
Over twenty years of teaching, and of interacting with other law
teachers, suggest that Paul H. Robinson's Criminal Law may signify
such a development. Too many of today's criminal law teachers rely
too much on the Model Penal Code, delight too much in arcane controversies over its provisions, and engage too much in constructing
recondite systems of criminal law theory.
263 See supra note 110; cf. ROBINSON, supranote 5, at 538-39 (discussing generally
the "individuation" of the reasonable person standard in excuse defenses). See generally DRESS=R, supra note 22, at 288-89. See also Heather R. Skinazi, Comment, NotJust
a "ConjuredAfterthought": Using Duress as a Defense for Battered Women Who "Failto Protect," 85 CAL.L. REv. 993 (1997).
264 ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 492 n.31; see id. at 491-94.
265 Id. at 533 ("The challenge to current theorists is to articulate more precisely
the requirements of excuse, or to show that no greater articulation is possible.").
Robinson does not explore the latter option. For a rare acknowledgment of the theory's inability to resolve an issue of criminal law, see id. at 713-14, discusses individualization of the reasonable person standard in manslaughter cases.
266 See, e.g., DpRssLER, supra note 22; LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 26.
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For the teachers of my generation, it was easy to become enamored with the Model Penal Code. It heralded a new way of teaching
criminal law-from the general part to the specific-that contrasted
with the approach of the previous generation. 267 Embracing the
Model Penal Code in our teaching was a way to show that we were
new, bold, and enlightened. But a generation later it is the Code that
has become the orthodoxy in criminal law teaching. It is now time to
recognize that the American Law Institute's Model Code does not describe all or even most of American criminal law, and that for every
issue faced by the Code's drafters there is a variety of answers, some
old and some very new. Conveying this variety to our students will
surely better prepare them for the actual practice of law than will a
single-minded focus on the Model Penal Code.
Though my generation of criminal law teachers was eager to declare its independence from the old way of teaching the subject, we
continued to glory in one of the traditions of law teaching, showing
off our mastery of the interplay of obscure legal rules. Perhaps we
forwent the maddening distinctions among larceny, embezzlement,
and false pretenses, but we instead plunged into the intricacies of the
Model Code, teasing out, for example, the interrelated vagaries of its
provisions on conduct, circumstances, and results; purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence; and complicity, attempt, and conspiracy. Of course professors of criminal law should teach some of
these interrelations-but we should have a better excuse for doing so
than the mere fact that it makes us look erudite. A good test would be
to ask whether our students likely will ever again encounter the statutory language; if the answer is no, we should bypass the opportunity to
parade our knowledge.
A newer tradition in law teaching is system-building, the quest for
deep structure, for a conceptual framework. Many criminal law teachers of my generation chose their occupation because of the scope it
provided for this kind of philosophizing about a profoundly important aspect of public policy. And so we construct theories of actus reus
and mens rea, of imputation, of justification, and excuse. Such theory-building surely is a valid aspect of teaching and learning criminal
law, but when theory begins to crowd out or otherwise to contort the
268
law as it is, the learning of our students inevitably suffers.

267 See Robert Batey, Book Review, 8 STETSON L. REV. 259, 260-61 & n.14 (1978)
(reviewing 1 FRANcis WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW (Charles E. Torcia ed., 1978)).
268 For a theory of my own, subject to the same criticism, see Batey, supra note 70.
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The practice lives of these students will prove the merit of our
teaching. 2 69 If we can resist the ease of teaching the Model Penal
Code as if it were the law everywhere, the gratification of splitting
hairs about its provisions, and the allure of erecting elaborate theoretical structures to encompass it, we teachers of criminal law may be
pleasantly surprised by the marks the lawyering of our students gives
us. If we cannot, we may try to blame the low grades we will surely
receive on leaders of the professoriate like Paul H. Robinson-but the
failure will truly be our own.

269 A possible explanation for the focus of Robinson's treatise is that the elite students he teaches at Northwestern are unlikely ever actually to practice criminal law, so
his book aims instead to train theoreticians of criminal law, who may someday advise a
legislature on amending its criminal laws or perhaps teach the subject. (The treatise's
emphasis on strict and corporate liability, see RoBINSON, supra note 5, at 250-56,
355-60, 363-69, 371-75, the few areas of criminal law elite practitioners are likely to
encounter, supports this surmise). Giving credence to the criticism of Judge Harry
Edwards and others that academic law is becoming less and less relevant to the practice of law, see Harry T. Edwards, The GrowingDisjunctionBetween LegalEducationand the
Legal Profession, 91 MIcE. L. REv. 34 (1992); see generally Symposium: Legal Education,91
MICH. L. Rrv. 1921 (1993), such a focus renders the treatise largely useless to students
at non-elite schools, who may someday have to handle a criminal case-unless of
course they have a teacher who insists on training them not for this function, but for
the "philosopher-king" functions few if any of them will ever be asked to perform.
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